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TELEPHONE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN:
DIFFERING REGULATORY REGIMES, DIFFERING SOCIETIES
STEVEN M. SPAETH"
INTRODUCTION
New technology is revolutionizing all industries, but possibly none more than
telecommunications. All over the world, countries are reforming their
telecommunications regulations to adapt to this revolution. In the United
States, the break-up of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
("AT&r)l has been discussed extensively.2  The privatization of British
Telecom in the United Kingdom has also received a great deal of attention
In addition, the Member States of the European Economic Community are in
the process of adopting new telecommunications regulations.4
On April 1, 1985, Japan also privatized its telecommunications industry and
opened it up to competition. s After this transformation, and five years of
regulating a private telecommunications company, the Japanese Ministry of Posts
* . B.S. Econ., Eastern Michigan University; J.D., Northwestern University, Currently Staff
Attorney, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C.; member of the Wisconsin Bar
Association.
The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Commission. The
Author would like to thank Professor Phillip Martin of Northwestern University for his helpful
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1. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1982) (Modified Final Judgment" or "MF.P".
2. Hillman, Telecommunications Regulation: Martyrdom of the Regulated Monopolist, 79 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1183 (1985).
3. Bhattacharyya & Laughhunn, Price Cap Regulation: Can WeLeam From the British Telecom
Fa'erience?, 120 PuB. UnM. FORT. 20 (Oct. 15, 1987).
4. See Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications
Services and Equipment, COM(87)290 final (Brussels, June 30, 1987); Implementing the Green Paper
on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment,
COM(88)48 final (Brussels, Feb. 9, 1988). For a description of the Green Paper, see Comment, A
Comparative Study of the Regulatory Treatment of Enhanced Services in the United States and the
European Community, 9 Nw. J. INTL L. & Bus. 415 (1988).
5. Nippon Denshin Denwa Kabushikigaisha Ho ('Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company
Act!r(Law No. 85,1984) [hereinafter NTT Act]; Denki Tsushin Jigyo Ho ('Electric Telecommunica-
tion Business Act) .(Law No. 86,1985)[hereinafterTelecommunications Act]; Nippon Denshin Denwa
Kabushiki gaisha Ho oyobi Denki Tsushin Jigyo Ho shiko ni tomonau Kansei Horitsu no seibi to ni
kansurn Horitsu ('Act Concerning the Adjustment of the Relating Acts Pursuant to the Enforcement
of The Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company Act and Electric Telecommunication Act")(Law
No. 87, 1984)[hereinafter Enforcement Act]. DOiNG BustNEss IN JAPAN, STATUTE VOLUME, app. 1A,
at 62-65 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1990).
For a good summary of the new telecommunications laws, see Masuda, Japanese Telecommunica-
tions Takes on a Brand New Look, TeLEPHONY 42-45, 81 (Jan. 28,1985); Okuyama, Stiff Competition
Seen in Japan's Telecommunications Industy, BusINESS JAPAN 45 (June 1987); Comment, Reform of
Japanese Telecommunications Law: Panacea or Placebo, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 145, 164-68 (1987);
Note, Dialingfor Foreign Telecommunications MarketAccess: Is the United States Getting a Busy Signal
from Japan?, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 495, 509-14 (1987).
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and Telecommunications ("MPT) has started to deal with regulatory problems
similar to those faced by the United States Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"). Comparing the way the United States and Japan handle these
problems provides an interesting insight into their cultures as a whole. This
Article provides this comparison, which ultimately reveals that the Japanese
tolerate greater governmental authority than Americans.
Section I briefly surveys the telecommunications industry, and discusses how
new technology has affected the industry, and its regulation in general. Section
II examines how Japan and the United States have reformed their telecommuni-
cations regulations to adapt to this new technology. Section III focuses on -three
specific regulatory problems common to Japan and the United States, and
discusses how both countries have responded to these issues. The conclusion
explores the relevance of telecommunications regulation to the understanding of
society as a whole.
I. REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Until very recently, all local and long distance telephone service was provided
through a network of telephone wires stretching across the country. This
network was very expensive to build initially, but once the network was in place,
new telephones could be added inexpensively. Therefore, the more telephones
connected to the network, the cheaper it was for each telephone customer.6 In
other words, the telephone industry had large "economies of scale."7 Conse-
quently, when given a choice between one telephone network acting as a
monopoly and several acting in competition, consumers would prefer the
monopoly because they would benefit from economies of scale.8 In economics
this is known as a natural monopoly.9
However, even though a natural monopoly has the potential to serve
consumers better than several competing firms, there is no incentive to do so.
Unrestrained monopolies have the power to artificially limit the availability of
telephone service, raise telephone rates, and earn excessive profits.10 Thus,
some government regulation is necessary to prevent excessive rates and profits."
Both local and long distance telephone service were natural monopolies until
recently. By the early 1960s, microwave technology had developed to a point
where long distance service no longer required wires, and this technology was
6. NV. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLIcY 472 (1982).
7. J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PuBuc UTILITY RATES 10-17 (1961); W. BAUMOL & A.
BLINDER, supra note 6, at 472, 808.
8. W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 6, at 500-01.
9. Natural monopolies themselves have been the subject of a great deal of literature. For a
small but excellent sample of this literature, see J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 7, at 10-17; A. KAHN, THE
EcoNoMIcs OF REGULATION (1971); B. ScHwARTZ, 3. FLYNN, H. FIRST, FREE ENTRPRISE AND
EcoNoMIc ORGANIZAMON: GOVERNMENT REGULATION 68-71 (6th ed. 1985); NV. BAUMOL & A.
BLINDER, supra note 6, at 497-503.
10. J. BONaRIGHT, supra note 7, at 10-17; W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 6, at 497.
11. W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 6, at 497, 808.
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beginning to be introduced in the United States and Japanese telecommunica-
tions markets.2 Microwave technology removed the natural monopoly charac-
teristics from long distance service, making competition possible.3 These new
market conditions prompted Japan and the United States to adapt their
regulatory systems to modem technology.
If. ADAPTATION TO NEW MARKET CONDITIONS
A Japan
The telephone was introduced to Japan in 1877.' 4 The debate over whether
the telecommunications monopoly should be owned by the government or the
private sector lasted thirteen years. 5 On one side of the debate were members
of the business community who supported private ownership because they
wanted an opportunity to enter the industry.' 6 In addition, the Ministry of
Finance supported privatization because it did not want the government to bear
the large costs of initial investment.17 Other governmental ministries, however,
offered several arguments in favor of government ownership. First, the telegraph
system was already a government monopoly owned and operated by the Ministry
of Technology. 8 Second, the police had been using the telephone in law
enforcement during these debates, and a government monopoly could better
maintain security. 9 Third, the government could more easily extend telephone
service to rural areas. 20 Finally, most major industrialized countries used the
government monopoly model t2' These arguments prevailed, and in 1890, the
Ministry of Communications started operating the telephone monopoly.22
In 1948, General Douglas MacArthur, as the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers ("SCAP"),23 ordered the Japanese government to reorganize the
telephone monopoly as a kosha, or "public company," in an attempt to reform
12. Allocation of Microwave Frequencies Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959), aff'd on
rehearing, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960); Hillman, supra note 2, at 1187; Ito, Recent Trends in Telecommunica-
dons Regulations and Markets in Japan, 25 JuRaMfrRrcs J. 70, 74 (1984).
13. Modifted Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp. at 172 n.172; Hilman, supra note 2, at 1187-93.
14. Ito, supra note 12, at 72.
15. Id-
16. Id.
17. Id
18. The telegraph was introduced to Japan in 1869, when the private economy was in such
disrepair that it could not have handled the telegraph system. Id For a good discussion of the civil
strife in Japan prior to the Meiji Restoration in 168, see E. RBSCHAuER & A. CRAiG, JAPAN:
TRADTON AND TRANSFORMATON 116-44 (1978).
19. Ito, supra note 12, at 72.
20. Id
21. Id
22. The Ministry of Communications was created in 1885 to take over the telegraphs from the
Ministry of Technology and mail service from the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. Id
23. Eventually, the entire Allied occupation became known as SCAP.
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the Japanese labor movement.24 At first, SCAP encouraged the development
of a labor movement, but became less enthusiastic when the movement began to
attract Marxist influences.25 The most radical elements eventually became
concentrated in the government-owned businesses.O In 1947, the railroad
industry was crippled by strikes, and the rehabilitation of the entire Japanese
economy seemed in danger.z7 Also in 1947, the National Public Employees Act
was enacted,m which prohibited government employees from striking.29 The
prohibition was extended to employees of kosha in 1948.3 Thus, it applied to
the telephone monopoly, which was also organized as a kosha in 1948.
After the Occupation was over, the Japanese Diet (national legislature)
established two government monopolies, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph
Public Corporation ("NT) for domestic service in 1952, and Kokusai Kenchin
Denwa Co., Ltd. ("KDD") for international service in 1953 ,3 and created the
MPT to regulate them.33 In addition to addressing MacArthur's labor concerns,
the Diet wanted to inject efficiency and flexibility into telephone managemente
to rebuild a telephone network crippled by World War 11?5 The Diet also
reaffirmed the commitment it made in 1890 to avoid wasteful duplication of
facilities, achieve economies of scale, and develop nationwide telephone
service.' Finally, the Japanese government felt it could use its control of the
telephone system to promote other Japanese industries.37
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Japanese business community began to
complain that the government-owned telecommunications monopoly could not
respond to changes in technology quickly enough to satisfy its needs? The
MPT created a special Telecommunications Policy Division in response to these
complaints.39  However, this reform was not enough, and the Diet passed
legislation privatizing NTT and opening up its telecommunications market to
24. C. JOHNSON, JAPAN'S PUBUC POLICY CoMNIEs 29-30 (1978).
25. E. RESCHAtER & A. CRAIG, supra note 18, at 282-83; D. HALBERSrAM, THE RECKaoNING
111-30 (1986).
26. C. JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 29.
27. Id
28. Kokka Komuin Ho ("National Public Employees Act"), Law No. 120 (1947).
29. See H. TANAKA, TIE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEm 354 (1976).
30. Kokyo Kigyo-tai to Rodo Kankei Ho C.abor Relations in Public Enterprises Act"), Law
No. 257 (1948).
31. C. JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 29-30.
32. Ito, supra note 12, at 73; Comment, supra note 5, at 148 n.20. Kokusai Denchin Denwa
translates roughly to "the second telephone company."
33. Ito, supra note 12, at 73.
34. Id.
35. Comment, supra note 5, at 149 n.24.
36. IAd at 148.
37. Ie at 149.
38. Ito, supra note 12, at 74; Note, supra note 5, at 501.
39. Ito, supra note 12, at 74; Note, supra note 5, at 501.
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competition.4 This was done for three reasons. First, nationwide service had
already been established. 1 Second, the government felt that the public would
be better served by private corporations subject to competition since competition
would force prices down. 42 Third, the government felt that privatization would
promote technological innovation and help Japanese firms compete world-
wide.4
Prior to the enactment of the new telecommunications legislation, the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry ("MITI") proposed alternative legislation.
MITI wanted to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the new enhanced services
industry.44 In essence, MITI wanted MPT jurisdiction to be limited to basic
telephone service45 The MPT, however, did not want its jurisdiction to be
limited. It wanted to control who was allowed to enter the industry, and wanted
to exert the same kind of influence that MITI exerted on other parts of the
economy.4 The MPT may also have been motivated by the higher status
associated with a sesaku kancho, or "policy agency," relative to jigyo kancho, or
"business operating agency."4 As a compromise, the MT retained authority
to regulate telecommunications and set interconnect standards,4s but its power
over market entry was limited.49
The new telecommunications legislation divides Japanese telecommunications
companies into Type I and Type II companies. 50 Type I companies provide basic
40. See NTT Act, supra note 5.
41. Comment, supra note 5, at 163. In 1987, Japan had 46 million telephones serving 39
million households. Nasty Ca!L by the Thousands London Times, Aug. 11, 1987, at 26, col. 4.
42. Comment, supra note 5, at 163.
43. Id; Note, supra note 5, at 503-04.
44. Ito, Telecommunications and Industrial Policies in Japan: Recent Developments, in
MARKETPLACE FOR TF.LECOMMUNCATIONS: REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN INDUSTRIAIZED
DEMOcRAcIEs 217 (M.S. Snow ed. 1986).
45. I at 219.
46. I at 220. MITI is the Japanese agency responsible for "industrial policy." There are two
elements to Mm's industrial policy. The first is "industrial rationalization policy," in which MITI
makes judgments on production technologies and methods in a particular industry, and forced the
companies in that industry to adopt what MITI considers to be the best method. Occasionally,
companies are forced out of business under this policy. The second element of MITI's industrial
policy is "industrial structure policy," in which MITI forces investment away from what it considers
declining industries, and into what MITI deems to be rising industries. C. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE
JAPANESE MIRACLE 26-29 (1982).
As an example of industrial rationalization policy, Kazuo Yamanouchi uses a MITI requirement
that all the farmers in a certain geographic area raise a certain breed of pig. Yamanouchi,
Administrative Guidance and the Rule of La, 7 LAw IN JAPAN SYSEml 22-31 (1974), reprinted in H.
TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSrm 390-91 (1976). As a part of its industrial structure policy in
the 1970s, MITI ordered cartels to be formed in the textile, rubber, steel shipbuilding, and some
petrochemical industries. Limits on market shares were placed on the companies in each industry,
and each company was ordered to retrain or pension a certain number of employees. C. JOHNSON,
supra, at 303. In 1965, MITI ordered the steel industry to reduce production. When one company
refused, MITI cut its coal import quota. H. TANAKA, supra note 29, at 368-70.
47. Ito, supra note 44, at 219.
48. Telecommunications Act, supra note 5, § (7).
49. Ito, supra note 44, at 220.
50. Telecommunications Act, supra note 5, § (4).
1990]
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telephone service through their own facilities.51 Type II companies lease lines
from Type I carriers, and provide "value-added" or "enhanced" service.52 Type
II companies are further subdivided into "special" companies, providing
nationwide or international service, and "general" companies, which are all
non-special companies. 3 All new Type I carriers need to be licensed by the
MPT. 4 General Type II carriers must notify the MPT of their intent to provide
service, and special Type II carriers must register with the MPT.55 There are
now five Type I carriers providing service, including NTT.56 There are also four
companies with Type I licenses which have not begun operating yet.5  Another
company, Satellite Japan, applied for a Type I license, but it was rejected in
1986.58 There are now over 300 Type II carriers.59
Although these reforms are considered deregulation, the new legislation still
provides MPT with a great deal of authority to mold the telecommunications
industry to serve the public interest.0
B. The United States
Since the invention of the telephone in 1876, AT&T has been the most
significant telecommunications service provider in the United States.61 For the
first ten or fifteen years of its existence, AT&T's monopoly was protected by the
patent laws.62 However, from 1893 to about 1915, AT&T competed with other
telephone companies.63 Competition created: (1) inefficient duplication of
facilities, (2) produced unreasonably high revenues for some carriers and
inadequate revenues for others, (3) limited availability of service in remote, rural
areas, and (4) created unreasonably high rates for consumers. Most states
started regulating telephone service between 1915 and 1920 to correct these
51. Ito, supra note 44, at 220.
52. Masuda, supra note 5, at 42; Comment, supra note 5, at 165.
The FCC defines a "value-added" or "enhanced" service as a service 'Which employ computer
processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the
subscriber's transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured
information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information." 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a)(1990).
For more discussion of these services, see Comment, supra note 4.
53. Telecommunications Act, supra note 5, § (4); Masuda, supra note 5, at 42.
54. Telecommunications Act, supra note 5, § (5)1.
55. Id § (6); Masuda, supra note 5, at 42; Comment, supra note 5, at 166.
56. The Competitive Dawn Breaks in Japan, TELEPHONY 66, 66 (L. Lannon ed. July 2, 1987)
[hereinafter Competitive Dawn].
57. Id
58. Comment, supra note 5, at 170.
59. Competitive Dawn, supra note 56, at 66; Okuyama, supra note 5, at 53.
60. Note, supra note 5, at 514-16.
61. See gen erally Modified Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp. at 131; Lavey, The Public Policies That
Changed the Telephone Industry Into Regulated Monopolies: Lessons FromAround 1915, 39 FED. COM.
LJ. 171, 179 (1988).
62. Lavey, supra note 61, at 177.
63. Id.
[V/ol. 27
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problems." Some regulators found that competition in a natural monopoly
market was inefficient, and demanded that telephone service be provided by one
company." Furthermore, AT&T began to lobby for regulation in order to erect
barriers to entry into the telephone market." Unlike Japan, however, there is
a traditional mistrust of government ownership of industry in the United
States.67 This mistrust is why the United States has never seriously considered
nationalizing AT&T.68
The changes in the U.S. telecommunications industry that would eventually
make competition possible began in the 1950s. At that time, telecommunica-
tions companies began using microwave radio technology to develop private
communications networks for large industrial corporations.69  AT&T often
complained to the FCC that these private line networks would reduce its
revenues in urban areas, and therefore make it more difficult to provide service
to rural areas. 70 At the time, the FCC did not view this as a real threat, so it
allowed companies to build these private line networks'.7  Nevertheless, these
private line systems did eventually develop the capability to compete with
AT&T.72
United States telecommunications regulations were reformed in 1982 when
Judge Harold Greene, sitting in the Federal District Court of the District of
Columbia, held that new developments in microwave and satellite technology
64. See generally Lavey, supra note 61.
65. Id at 179-80.
66. Robinson, The Federal CommunicadonsAct" An Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose,
in A LEGISLATIvE HISroRY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACr OF 1934 3-8 (M. Paglin ed. 1989)
[hereinafter Robinson].
67. W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 6, at 497.
68. The telephone industry was first placed under regulation under the Mann-Elkins Act, 34
Stat. 539, 545 (1910) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). The Mann-Elkins Act was
intended to strengthen the ICC's authority over railroads and establish a separate "Commerce Court"
to review ICC decisions. The Mann-Elkins Act was amended on the House floor to extend the ICC'sjurisdiction to the telecommunications industry. Therefore, the decision to regulate telephones was
almost an afterthought, and there was no discussion of substantive regulatory policy or whether to
nationalize the industry. See 45 CONG. REC. 5533-37, 6972-77; Robinson, supra note 66, at 4-8.
When the FCC was created, the intent was to transfer the existing powers of the ICC to a new
regulatory body. Robinson, supra note 66, at 4-8. No one in the Senate even suggested nationalizing
AT&T. See S. REP. No. 3285, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 4 THE ECONOMIC REGULATION
OF BuSINEss AND INDusTRY 2425 (B. Schwartz ed. 1973).
69. Hillman, supra note 2, at 1187-88.
70. This is often referred to as "cream-skimming."
71. See eg., Allocation of Microwave Frequencies Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959), affid
on rehearing, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960); Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C. 2d 953 (1969), rehg
denied, 21 F.C.C. 2d 190 (1970); Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29 F.C.C. 2d 870 (1971),
reh'g denie4 31 F.C.C. 2d 1106 (1971), affd sub noma. Washington Utility and Transportation
Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cern denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
72. MCI v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) CFxecunet/1"; MCI v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590(D.C. Cir. 1978) C'Execunet 11). For an overview of this evolution, see Hillman, supra note 2, at
1187-98.
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eliminated the natural monopoly character of long distance service. 73 There-
fore, Judge Greene required that AT&T divest itself of its local service com-
panies.74 Judge Green also reorganized the local service companies into seven
regional holding companies ("RHCs") rather than one nationwide holding
company.75 The purpose of this reorganization was to remove the local service
companies' incentive to act as a "bottleneck," or in other words, to control which
long distance companies were provided with access to consumers.76  The
primary factor motivating these regulatory reforms was general antitrust law.
The court wanted to promote competition to benefit consumers and other firms
in the industry.77
A comparison at this stage reveals the divergent policies pursued by Japan and
the United States in developing their telecommunications industries. While
Japan sought to assist Japanese telecommunication firms competing in foreign
markets, Judge Greene did not express any concerns over promoting foreign
competition!" Also unlike Japan, Judge Greene did not place any restrictions
on entry into the telecommunications market. 79 The Japanese government
retained authority to control the telecommunications market, while the United
States placed its emphasis on limiting AT&T's ability to control the market, and
did not place any other restrictions on the operation of market forces.
III. COMMON REGULATORY PROBLEMS
A Control Over Pricing
1. Japan. When NTT was a government monopoly, it had authority to set its
own prices, even though its budget had to be approved by the MPT, the Cabinet,
and the Diet.8° Now NTT is a regulated company, but it still sets its own
prices. The MPT, however, oversees NIT's prices to ensure that they are not set
so low that other carriers are deterred from entering the market.81
The MPT has never developed any guidelines for setting prices.82 Instead, the
73. Modified Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp. at 160-63. Judge Greene retained jurisdiction over
the administration of the MFJ, and therefore exercises great power over the regulation of the United
States telephone system. Id at 231.
74. Id at 160-70.
75. Id. at 161.
76. Id For more on the access issue and bottleneck facilities, see notes 119-20, infra.
77. Id at 149-51.
78. See generally id. In the case, AT&T asserted that the divestiture would limit its ability to
innovate. Although the Court recognized that a reduction in innovation would not be in the "public
interest," it eventually rejected AT&T's claims as unfounded. Id. at 147-49.
79. See generally id.
80. Comment, supra note 5, at 150.
81. See NTT Act, supra note 5, § (4). See also Competitive Dawn, supra note 56, at 70; Doe,
Japan's $20 Billion Telecom Giant at the Crossroads, ELECiRONIC Bus. 132 (Oct 1, 1985). See
generally Meet Japan's Telecom Giant: NTT's Dr. Hisashi Shinto, TELEPHONY 32 (May 25, 1987)
(Interview with President and Chief Executive Officer of NTI').
82. Doe, supra note 81, at 132.
[Vol. 27
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MPT exercises control over NTrs prices by a process commonly employed in
other areas of Japanese administrative law known as gyosei shido ("administrative
guidance"). Administrative guidance is an administrative agency's request that
a corporation voluntarily comply with the agency's wishes, whether or not the
agency has statutory authority to make the request 3  One Japanese legal
scholar asserts that these suggestions carry weight because Japanese society has
historically adopted an attitude of kanson mimpi, or "respect the officials and
downgrade the people."84 Therefore, these suggestions can carry as much force
as an application of public authority, even though compliance is nominally
voluntary.'
The agency usually has a definite plan for the organization and future of an
industry, and through administrative guidance, it requests businessmen, orally or
in writing, to conduct themselves in conformity with this plan.& However,
unlike agencies in the United States, Japanese agencies are usually not required
to make this plan publicP "[because] many of the activities are conducted infor-
mally and because the government offices concerned do not like to clarify their
contents, it is difficult to grasp them clearly."88
In the case of telecommunications, the MPT seems to be actively promoting
the development of a market in which several companies compete with NTI'.
In other words, the MPT has retained the power to shape the telecommunica-
tions market in ways it considers beneficial.
2 The United States. In contrast to Japan's pricing policies, which give the
MT a great deal of discretion, the procedures for setting prices in the United
States are specifically prescribed by statute.? The traditional method of
regulation is called "rate of return" regulation.91 Under rate of return regula-
tion, the telephone company is guaranteed a fair rate of return on its invest-
ment 2 Specifically, the telephone company is guaranteed the recoupment of
its investment in equipment used and useful in the provision of telephone
service, plus a just and reasonable rate of return, and all reasonably incurred
83. Narita,Admnistrative Guidance, 2 LAw IN JAPAN 45 (1968), reprinted in H. TANAKA, THE
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 354 (1976). For more on administrative guidance, see C. JOHNSON, supra
note 46, at 242-74.
84. H. TANAKA, supra note 29, at 356.
85. Id
86. Id, at 365.
87. See, ag., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
88. H. TANAKA, supra note 29, at 364.
89. Competitive Dawn, supra note 56, at 70; Doe, supra note 81, at 132; Comment, supra note
5, at 175; Okuyama, Deregulation Widely Affects Telecommunications, BusiNESS JAPAN 55, 55 (Aug.
1988).
90. Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-204 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
91. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 7; L SCHWARTz, J. FLYNN, & H. Fms'r, supra note 9, at 316.
92. The company is guaranteed a fair rate of return because the Supreme Court determined
that setting rates so that the company could not earn a fair return was confiscatory in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1898).
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expenses.9
3
Recently, the FCC has developed an alternative to rate of return regulation
called Price Cap regulation.94 Rather than setting limits on a carrier's rate of
return, Price Caps set limits on prices themselves.95 The caps increase with the
inflation rate minus three percent.96 The carrier is allowed to set its rates five
percent above or below present rates, as long as the weighted average of all its
rates does not exceed the applicable Price Cap.97
Within the context of this complex formula for determining telephone rates,
the Communications Act of 1934 specifies the pricing procedures the FCC and
telephone companies must follow. When the telephone company asks for a rate
increase, the FCC has ninety days to determine whether these rates are "just and
reasonable."93 The FCC can accept or reject these rates,99 initiate an investiga-
tion into the reasonableness of the rates,10° or prescribe a rate of its own.1E
If the FCC initiates an investigation and fails to make a ruling within five
months, the new rate goes into effect.1rt
In sum, the MPT has great latitude to promote competition in the Japanese
telecommunications market, while the FCC has limited its regulatory oversight
in an effort to release competitive forces in the United States market. While the
Japanese government maintains an active role in the economy, the United States
government views its role as one that removes impediments to competition, and
nothing more.
B. Cross-Subsidizadon
1. Japan. Cross-subsidization occurs when a communications common carrier
charges excessive prices on some services in order to charge below-cost prices on
93. During the first half of the twentieth century, much judicial energy was expended over the
proper way to determine whether rates are 'Just and reasonable." See genera//y L ScHwAt4z, J.
FLYNN, & H. FiRsr, supra note 9, at 363-409. In 1944, the United States Supreme Court settled this
issue in the Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). In Hope, the
Court developed the 'zone of reasonableness" test which stated that as long as the rates were high
enough to attract capital, but not so high as to be unfair to consumers, the rates were just and
reasonable. Id at 602-05.
94. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Common Carriers, 4 F.C.C. Red. 2783
(1989) C'Price Cap Order'. For an excellent discussion of Price Caps, see . H.ILMAN & R.
BRAEtIrGA1M, PRICE LEvEL REGULATION FOR DI'ERsIm_ PUBUC UTIITrIES (1989).
95. Price Cap Order, 4 F.C.C. Red. at 2893.
96. Id. at 2972-74. The Price Cap is set three percent less than the inflation rate because the
Commission found that the telecommunications industry has been an average of 2.5% more
productive than the economy as a whole, and expected telecommunications productivity to increase
an additional 0.5% in the future. Id. at 2994-96.
97. Id. at 3065-67.
98. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1988).
99. Id § 204.
100. Id
101. Id § 205.
102. Id § 204.
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other services.'03 Prior to 1985, NIT had always engaged in some form of
cross-subsidization charging excessive rates on long distance and equipment
installation fees to keep local telephone service rates low.'04
After April 1, 1985, this cross-subsidization was reduced because competition
in the equipment market forced MT to lower its equipment prices.' Since
cross-subsidization requires excessive rates to be charged for some services,
competition in the equipment market has made it harder for N'T to charge
higher rates. However, through administrative guidance,1°6 the MPT has infor-
mally prevented NT from reducing cross-subsidization too much.' MPT has
requested NT not to reduce its equipment fees below those charged by other
Type I carriers1es The MPT did this to keep local telephone rates low, and to
protect new JTpe I carriers from being driven out of the market by NTI'.'°
So far, NT has cooperated with the PT to achieve this goal."0
2. United States. Before the divestiture, AT&T cross-subsidized local rates with
long distance revenues."' This is no longer possible, because after the
divestiture, local and long distance service are provided by different companies.
The "access fee" that long distance carriers are required to pay to Local
Exchange Carriers ("LECs") tend to have the same effect."2 Originally, this fee
was a flat $2.00 per customer,n 3 but now access fees are determined by the rate
of return method applied to three accounting categories of access investment.114
The FCC, however, has prohibited AT&T from cross-subsidizing equipment
revenues since the early 1970s.i5 Under the "Maximum Separations" policy,
103. See Comment, supra note 4, at 416.
104. Comment, supra note 5, at 151-52.
105. I.d at 174.
106. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
107. Competitive Dawn, supra note 56, at 70-71; Doe, supra note 81, at 132.
108. Competitive Dawn, supra note 56, at 70-71.
109. Id
110. Id at 70. However, competition from other carriers may be eroding NITs willingness to
be cooperative. Norris, Behind the Slump in N.T.T. Shares, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27,1989, at 28, col. 1.
111. Hilman, supra note 2, 1214-20.
112. Id at 1217-18.
113. National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
114. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 69.1-69.612 (1990). As discussed above, the telephone company is
guaranteed the recoupment of its investment in equipment used in providing telephone service, plus
a just and reasonable rate of return, and all reasonably incurred expenses. See supra text
accompanying notes 90-93. The three accounting categories are Special Access, Common Line, and
Switched Traffic Sensitive. Special Access is made up mostly of investment on telephone lines
connecting end users directly to interexchange users. Common Line is investment in facilities
connecting end users or interexchange carriers to the local exchange network. Finally, Switched
Traffic Sensitive rates recover the costs of equipment which vary with use. See 47 C.F.R. § 65.702(b).
More specifications for setting prices are established in Part 69 of the FCC's rules. See 47 C.F.R.
§§ 69.4(b), 69.101-69.115.
115. Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer &
Communications Services & Facilities, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291(1970) C'Computer I,
Tentative Decision"), modifted, Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 267(1971) C'Computer I, Final Decision"),
aff'd in part sub nom. GTE Service Corp v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973). Computer I was
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carriers could offer customer premises equipment ("CPEn) only through a
separate subsidiary. The subsidiary is required to have separate officers and
operating personnel, and all business transactions between the parent and the
subsidiary are to be reported to the FCC.1t6 The FCC designed these rules to
prevent cross-subsidization in the other direction, i.e., to prevent overcharging
captive local service users and predatory pricing in the competitive equipment
market.117 The MFJ court reaffirmed these rules, and applied them to the
RHCs, but allowed them to market equipment manufactured by others."8
Again, rather than merely intervening directly in the decisions of businesses to
make adjustments as the Japanese MPT has done, the FCC has established
specific and detailed rules to regulate the telecommunications market.
C. Access to Consumers
1. United States. One of the most contentious telecommunications issues in
both the United States and Japan is consumer access. Because of the advances
in technology involving microwave transmissions and satellites, it is no longer
necessary to have wires strung from city to city to connect long distance calls.
When there is no longer a need for wires, long distance service loses its natural
monopoly characteristics. Consequently, long distance service can be provided
in a competitive market.119 However, wires are still required to provide local
telephone service. Thus, if one company provides both local and long distance
service, it has an incentive to arrange its local facilities in such a way that no
other long distance carriers can provide their service to consumers. 0 Accord-
ingly, the local network is often referred to as a "bottleneck" facility.
In order to prevent the abuse of bottleneck facilities, the MFJ prohibits RHCs
from engaging in many kinds of businesses m' such as the manufacture of
telecommunications products, m information services,m CPE,u24 and adver-
tising directories.1 s Most importantly, the MFJ prohibits the RHCs from
modified in later years, but its rules covering equipment have not been affected. See Second
Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), modified on reconsideration, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980),
further modified on reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981) aff'd sub nom. Computer and Communi-
cation Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983) ('Com-
puter 1P); Third Computer Inquiry, Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986), rev'd and remanded
in part, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) Computer III Order").
116. Computer I, Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 303-04.
117. Id See generally Comment, supra note 4, at 419-20.
118. Modified FinaIJudgment, 552 F. Supp. at 186. For more on the maximum separation rules,
see Comment, supra note 4, at 419-20.
119. Modified Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp. at 160-63; Hillman, supra note 2, at 1215.
120. Comment, supra note 4, at 417.
121. Modified Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp. at 185-90.
122. Id, at 190-91.
123. Id. at 189-90.
124. Id at 190-91.
125. Id at 193-94.
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providing long distance service. The MFJ court promised to review the
industry every three years to determine if these "line of business" restrictions
were still necessary to protect competition.m At the first review, all seven
RHCs petitioned the court to relax these restrictions, but the court refusedY8
2 Japan. In 1987, Japan faced a major consumer access dispute.' The
dispute was over establishing a third trans-Pacific cable providing international
telephone service between Japan and the United States to compete with
KDD.L0 Two consortiums were interested in developing the third cable. One
was led by Matsushita Electric Industrial Company and Mitsubishi Corporation,
and was made up completely of Japanese companies.13' The other was led by
Cable and Wireless PLC of Great Britain, C. Itoh of Japan, and Pacific Telesis
of the United States, and was made up of several companies from the United
States, Japan, and Europe."2 Since MPT felt that the international market was
not large enough to support four cables, 33 it suggested that the two consor-
tiums mergel 4 and limit the share for each Japanese company to 5% and
foreign companies to 3% 35 Both the United Statestm and Great Britain"
interpreted this proposal as protectionistic1 8  The all-Japanese consortium
wanted to share KDD's cable. But, the Cable and Wireless consortium argued
that this would hinder the development of real competition39--if other
competitors were required to use KDD's cable, KDD could use its cable as a
bottleneck facility to restrict its competitors' access to consumers.
126. Id at 188-89. The country is divided into approximately 200 local access and transport
areas ("LATA"). The RHCs are not allowed to provide service across LATA boundaries.
127. Id. at 194-95.
128. United States v. Western Electric Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987). Later the court
reaffirmed other line-of-business restrictions, but relaxed the prohibition against information services,
allowing the RHCs to transmit information generated by others but not to generate it themselves in
Western Electric, 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CC1-) 167, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1988). This was overturned by the
Court of Appeals in United States v. Western Electric Co., 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
129. The press covered this dispute rather heavily, although it focused on the foreign trade
aspects of the issues.
130. The second trans-Pacific cable was a fiber-optic cable. AT&T and KDD agreed to enter
into a joint venture to lay this cable in early 1987. AT&T, Japanese Firm Discuss Constructing Pacific
Phone Line, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1987, at 51, col. 2. This was completed in April 1989. Sims, Fiber-
Optic Calling to Japan Starts Today, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1989, at 33, col 3.
131. Roberts, Pacific Telesis Joins Bid to Build Japan-US. Link, Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1987, at 5,
col. 1.
132. Id
133. Lachica, Japan Bars Wder Foreign Participation in Venture on Telecommunications Link,
Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1987, at 5, col. 1.
134. Id
135. Marcom,AsBritain Inches TowardRetaliation, JapanAlterr Telecommunications Offer, Wall
St. J., Apr. 3, 1987, at 27, col. 4.
136. Lachica, supra note 133, at 5, col. 1.
137. Marcom, supra note 135, at 27, col. 4.
138. 1d
139. Darlin, Cable& Wreiess Proposal May Force Trade Dispute With Japan to a Head, Wall St.
J., July 28, 1987, at 29, col. 5.
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The Cable and Wireless consortium proposed an alternative merger plan, in
which four companies from each consortium would hold 72% of the new
consortium, of which non-Japanese companies would hold 33%. 140 However,
when the all-Japanese consortium rejected this proposal, 4' the Japanese
government agreed to grant licenses to both consortiums in order to avoid trade
disputes with Great Britain and the United States. 142 The new trans-Pacific
cable is expected to be completed by 1990.14
As the above discussion illustrates, there is a sharp contrast in the way Japan
and the United States handled recent consumer access disputes. While the FCC
established rules designed to lead to equal access without direct government
intervention in the market, the MPT tried to push telecommunications
companies to a negotiated access arrangement.
CONCLUSION
A comparison of the way the United States and Japan deal with regulatory
problems provides an interesting insight into their cultures as a whole, and leads
to several conclusions. First, people in the United States prefer to have their
rights and responsibilities explicitly defined, while the Japanese assume that they
are aware of their responsibilities and that an explicit definition is unnecessary.
Second, Japan places a higher premium on cooperation and harmony than does
the United States. Third, Japan views its government as a force for good, while
Americans tend to view their government as a necessary evil.
Thus, the Japanese are much more reluctant than Americans to establish a
very detailed regulatory system. Also, the Japanese assume that everyone knows,
understands, and accepts their place in society, while Americans prefer to have
expectations spelled out explicitly. This is probably due to the heavy influence
of Confucianism'" and to the high level of ethnic homogeneity which shapes
the Japanese attitude. 14
This cultural dichotomy is reflected in the very informal way the MPT oversees
NTT pricing, and the detailed manner in which the FCC oversees AT&T
pricing. 4' This is also reflected in the continued effectiveness of the adminis-
trative guidance system in the area of cross-subsidization.'47 NTr cooperates
with the MPT in not competing all-out with other Type I carriers, even though
140. I4
141. Talks Fail Between Cable & Wireles, Japanese Group, Wall St. 1., Aug. 5,1987, at 19, col.
2.
142. Cable & Wireless Venture Gets Japan Phone License, Wail St. J., Dec. 1, 1987, at 33, col.
4.
143. Sims, supra note 130, at 33, col. 3.
144. R. CH isToPHER, THE JAPANESE MIND 46-47 (1983); K. SMrTM, JAPANESE SOCIETY:
TRADMON, SEUF ANDTHE SOCIAL ORDER31-33 (1983); E. REISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE 213-14 (1977);
E. REMcHAuER & A. CRAIG, supra note 18, at 92-94.
145. E. REISCHAUER, supra note 144, at 413; E. REiscHAuE & A. CRAIG, supra note 18, at 3.
146. See Doe, supra note 81, at 132.
147. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
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it is not under any legal compunction to do so.48 However, when the FCC
wants to influence AT&T's behavior, it must promulgate rules in compliance
with the Communications Act of 193419 and the Administrative Procedure
Act.10
Another cultural aspect which influences telecommunications regulation is that
Japan places a higher premium than the United States on cooperation and har-
mony. Accordingly, the Japanese government encouraged the Cable and
Wireless consortium and the all-Japanese consortium to merge so it could avoid
rejecting either application. The government awarded both licenses, even though
it did not believe the market could support that much competition. 1
Finally, the Japanese people tend to view government as a force for good, and
therefore, the government is given broad power to promote the proper
development of the economy and the proper formation of the social order."2
In contrast, Americans tend to view government as an entity that only has the
limited authority to create an environment in which individuals can freely pursue
their economic interestsY. Thus, AT&T was left unregulated until the
government recognized the problems created by an unregulated telecommu-
nications industry.14 On the other hand, the Japanese government owned NTr
from 1952 to 1985, and only gave up ownership when it became clear that the
private sector could run NTT better.15
Perceptions of the proper role of government have also influenced the method
each nation used to reform their telecommunications regulations. Japan chose
to reform its regulations through legislation, rather than through application of
its general antimonopoly law as was done in the United States."56 Japan
probably made this choice because NTT and KDD, as government monopolies,
were exempt from the antimonopoly laws." 7 The effect of this difference, in
fora, was to reinforce the active government role in Japan and increase the
passive government role in the United States. The purpose of the divestiture in
the United States was to restrain AT&T so that other telephone companies
could develop and compete."8 On the other hand, the Japanese reforms give
148. Compeitive Dawn, supra note 56, at 70.
149. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1988 & Supp. 1990)
150. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
151. Lachica, supra note 133, at 5.
152. See H. TANAKA, supra note 29, at 354.
153. kd at 359.
154. Lavey, supra note 61, at 184-90.
155. Comment, supra note 5, at 162-63.
156. Modified Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp. at 149-51.
157. '"he provisions of this Act shall not apply to such acts relating to the production, sale, or
supply as are done in the proper course of business by a person engaging in a railway, electricity, gas
or any other enterprise constituting a monopoly by the nature of the said business." Antimonopoly
Act (Law No. 54, 1947) § (21), translated in H. IYoRi & A. UtSUGI, TaE ANMIMONOPOLY LAWS OF
JAPAN 111 (1983).
158. Modi&fed Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp. at 150.
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the MPT broad discretion to guide and structure the telecommunications indus-
try.
159
It is still too early to tell if the Japanese reforms will produce better or worse
results than the reforms in the United States.16° Some commentators are
recommending that the United States government follow the Japanese model
and provide guidance for the telecommunications industry.'6' Yet other
commentators are suggesting that Japan implement a more rigid, United States-
style industrial policy.162 However, if Japan's history provides any foresight, it
is very possible that Japanese telecommunications firms soon will be very
competitive in the world markets.163 However, this competitiveness will come
at the price of heavy governmental involvement in private business, a level of
involvement many in the United States would find intolerable. When people in
the United States envy the success of Japanese businesses, they should keep this
in mind.
159. NTT Act, supra note 5, § (4); MARMTLACE FOR TELECOMMmNCATIONS, supra note 44,
at 224.
160. Okuyama, supra note 5, at 53.
161. Weisman, The Proliferation of Private Networks and Its Implications ForRegulatov Reform,
41 FED. CoM. LJ. 331, 360 (1989).
162. Hiatt, A Lesson in Industrial Policy From Japanese Minitry?, Washington Post, Dec. 12,
1989, at Cl, col. 2.
163. See generally C. JOHNSON, supra note 46; D. HALBERSrAM, supra note 25 (successfulness
of the Japanese automobile industry).
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